From the Prison Tower

Overview

Normative ethics has historically assumed that moral agents possess libertarian free will, understood as the unencumbered capacity to choose freely between alternatives without biological or environmental constraint. Recent discoveries in neuroscience, genetics, and epigenetics challenge this assumption by demonstrating that human decision-making is substantially influenced by unconscious neural processes, genetic predispositions, and environmental conditions. This article examines how these scientific developments undermine the libertarian conception of free will and argues that normative ethics must be revised accordingly. By adopting a compatibilist framework—one that affirms agency while acknowledging constraint—ethics can be restructured to promote greater justice and fairness. The article further explores the implications of this revision for moral responsibility, virtue formation, and social justice, contending that ethical instruction and adjudication must account for unequal capacities among moral agents.

Introduction and Background

Beginning in the Renaissance, Western society underwent a foundational shift in its understanding of human identity and moral agency. Rather than viewing individuals primarily as creatures governed by divine determination, thinkers increasingly emphasized rational autonomy and self-authorship as defining features of the human person (Bruce, 2002; Habermas, 2002; Weber, 2003). This transformation laid the intellectual groundwork for the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the emergence of modern liberal institutions. Central to this worldview was the belief that individuals are capable of making rational, morally significant decisions free from coercive interference, including decisions about right and wrong (Harvey, 1990; Stark, 2005).

This conception of agency permeated philosophy, theology, psychology, law, and ethics, becoming foundational to modern moral systems. Contemporary ethical frameworks typically assume that individuals possess sufficient control over their actions to justify praise, blame, punishment, and reward (Dennett, 2003; Annas et al., 2017). Normative ethics, in particular, presupposes that moral agents are capable of understanding moral norms and choosing to follow or violate them. As Navarini (2020) notes, free will has functioned as a cornerstone of ethical reasoning since the Renaissance.

Free will is commonly defined as requiring three conditions: the availability of genuine alternatives, freedom from external interference, and rational deliberation guiding choice (Walter, 2011). Lavazza (2019) refers to this model as “ultimate authorship,” the belief that individuals are the primary originators of their actions. Normative ethics has largely relied on this assumption. However, advances in neuroscience, genetics, and epigenetics increasingly call this conception into question, creating tension between traditional ethical theory and empirical reality.

The Research Questions

Despite mounting evidence that human decision-making is constrained by unconscious neural activity, biological predispositions, and environmental conditions, much of normative ethics continues to assume libertarian free will. This disjunction risks misrepresenting human agency and perpetuating unjust systems of moral evaluation and punishment. If individuals do not possess equal capacities for self-control and rational deliberation, then ethical systems predicated on equal responsibility are fundamentally flawed.

This article addresses two primary research questions. First, to what extent do findings from neuroscience, genetics, and epigenetics alter the historical definition of free will? Second, how must normative ethics be modified in light of these findings to ensure just teaching and adjudication of moral responsibility?

Literature Review

Normative Ethics and Free Will

Normative ethics seeks to establish principles that guide moral judgment and action. Traditional ethical systems assume that individuals possess sufficient freedom and rationality to be held morally accountable (Pojman & Vaughn, 2015). However, philosophers such as Rawls (1971) and Nagel (1979) have challenged the assumption of equal moral capacity. Rawls argued that individuals are born into unequal social and biological conditions that shape their opportunities for success, while Nagel introduced the concept of moral luck, emphasizing the role of uncontrollable factors in moral outcomes.

The debate over free will has historically ranged from libertarianism to determinism, with compatibilism occupying an intermediate position. Libertarians maintain that individuals possess robust freedom independent of causal constraints (Kant, 2009; Rousseau, 2020). Determinists argue that all actions are the product of prior causes, rendering moral responsibility illusory (Harris, 2012). Compatibilists contend that free will exists but is constrained by biological and environmental factors (Dennett, 2003; Papanicolaou, 2017).

Neuroscience and Free Will

Neuroscientific research has significantly reshaped the free will debate. Kornhuber and Deecke (1965) discovered readiness potential, a measurable buildup of neural activity in the motor cortex preceding voluntary action. Libet (1985, 1999) expanded on this finding, demonstrating that neural activity precedes conscious awareness of decision-making by several hundred milliseconds. These results suggest that decisions originate unconsciously before entering awareness.

Subsequent studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging have reinforced these findings. Soon et al. (2008, 2013) demonstrated that patterns of brain activity could predict participants’ decisions several seconds before conscious awareness. Although critics argue that these experiments involve trivial choices, Gmeindl et al. (2016) extended this research to controlled attentional processes, showing that both automatic (System 1) and deliberative (System 2) processes are preceded by neural activity.

While these findings do not eliminate agency altogether, they challenge the notion that conscious deliberation is the primary initiator of action. Conscious will appears to function more as a modulatory or vetoing mechanism rather than as an ultimate originator of decisions (Libet, 1999; Navarini, 2020).

Genetics, Epigenetics, and Moral Agency

Genetic research has demonstrated that individuals are predisposed to a range of behavioral and psychological traits, including impulsivity, addiction, depression, and aggression (Crews & Boettiger, 2009; Ducci & Goldman, 2012). These predispositions influence how individuals perceive moral situations and regulate behavior. Far from being neutral agents, individuals enter the world with biologically shaped capacities and limitations.

Epigenetics further complicates the picture by showing that gene expression can be modified by environmental conditions such as trauma, stress, and violence (Sapolsky, 2004). Research indicates that these epigenetic changes can be transmitted across generations, embedding social disadvantage biologically (Serpeloni et al., 2017; Van Steenwyck et al., 2018). These findings reinforce Rawls’s (1971) claim that justice requires accounting for unequal starting points and Nagel’s (1979) insight into moral luck.

Decision-Making, Virtue, and Dual-Process Theory

Dual-process theory distinguishes between automatic, reactive System 1 processes and reflective, deliberative System 2 processes (Kahneman, 2011). Much moral failure occurs at the level of System 1, where responses are rapid and emotionally driven. Virtue ethics, however, emphasizes the formation of stable dispositions through habituation (Aristotle, trans. 2020).

Research on habit formation supports this account. Baumeister and Tierney (2011) demonstrate that repeated practice can transform controlled behaviors into automatic responses. Over time, virtuous agents develop reliable patterns of action that require less conscious effort. However, access to virtue formation is uneven. Individuals raised in unstable environments may lack the social support necessary to cultivate virtuous habits, limiting their moral agency.

Social Justice and Ethical Adjudication

Rawls’s (1971) theory of justice and Sen’s (1992) capabilities approach emphasize that justice requires compensating for unequal capacities. If moral agency is constrained by genetics and environment, then ethical systems must account for these differences. Treating unequal agents as equally responsible perpetuates injustice.

Normative ethics must therefore be revised to incorporate a compatibilist understanding of free will. Ethical instruction should attend to individual constraints, and adjudication should calibrate responsibility to actual capacity. Punishment and blame must be proportionate not only to outcomes but also to the agent’s ability to choose otherwise.

Conclusions

This article argues that normative ethics must move beyond libertarian free will in light of findings from neuroscience, genetics, and epigenetics. Libertarianism ignores substantial constraints on agency, while determinism fails to account for adaptability and conscious regulation. Compatibilism offers a more accurate and just framework, recognizing both agency and limitation.

Revising normative ethics in this way has significant implications for moral education, virtue formation, and social justice. Ethical systems must acknowledge unequal capacities among agents and respond with compassion and fairness. As scientific understanding of human behavior continues to evolve, ethical theory must adapt accordingly to ensure justice and human flourishing.

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The Complete Article is titled: Re-evaluating Ethics and Justice from the Panopticon of Neuroscience and Free Will. This article can be found at the Journal of Law and Society.